Its here - the ISW report warning that #ISIS is back in #Iraq & #Syria

From me with @thestudyofwar’s Brandon Wallace & Jason Zhou

Full report available online here: understandingwar.org/report/isiss-s…

Key points & graphics to follow
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#ISIS's "remnants" are much stronger than al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI/ISI) was when US forces withdrew from Iraq in 2011

ISIS has ~30K fighters. AQI had ~1K

ISIS has relatively intact leadership; AQIs was decimated

This chart gives a rough overall comparison (sources in report)
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ISIS's second comeback could be worse than its resurgence from 2012-2014

Our report explains how #ISIS likely already has the capacity to seize an urban center in #Iraq or #Syria but is waiting to build strength & degrade enemies so it can seize many at once & hold them

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#ISIS waged a sophisticated campaign to evade the defeat of its caliphate after the US intervened in 2014. ISIS's goal was to set military & political conditions to enable it to return quickly to an offensive insurgency after losing terrain. It succeeded.

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ISIS transitioned back to an insurgency long before losing its final territory in Baghuz #Syria (March 2019). Its vicious defense along the MERV bought time for its insurgency to mature

Our report adds to great work on this published by @hxhassan, @Mikeknightsiraq & others

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#ISIS began ceding terrain to the ISF after it lost #Mosul in July 2017 in order to disperse its forces into a new insurgency. The dispersal included surrenders (mostly to the pesh), withdrawals, and likely the infiltration of civilian flows to IDP camps. Mapped below
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ISIS dispersed in #Syria in roughly two waves.

In wave 1:
-#ISIS forces withdrew from #Raqqa & other areas to reinforce its control zone near Abu Kamal
-ISIS also likely infiltrated the civilian flows north
-ISIS formed new support zones in #Idlib & the Damascus desert

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In wave 2 in #Syria

-ISIS withdrew from the southern outskirts of #Damascus & along the Golan Heights to the Damascus desert
-ISIS then withdrew further after a pro-#Assad offensive
-ISIS also conducted a mass surrender of fighters, families, & civilians in #Baghuz

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#ISIS’s dispersed forces did not hibernate or suspend operations, instead going immediately on the offensive in both #Iraq and #Syria. This campaign gained momentum the fastest in rural parts of #Kirkuk province.

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#ISIS launched a new phase of its insurgency in July 2018 after #Baghdadi reasserted central control. ISIS media began referred to it as the "Soldiers Harvest", a reference to the campaign by the same name that it launched in July 2013. A noteworthy parallel.

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The original "Soldiers Harvest" set conditions for #ISIS's 2014 land grab & followed a campaign titled "Breaking the Walls" in which it damaged the Iraqi state w/ VBIEDs

ISIS skipped right to Soldiers Harvest this time, demonstrating it perceived itself in an advanced stage
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#ISIS's spokesman stated as much in April 2018 when he said "What victory do you speak of, O America, when the mujahidin … [have] a condition that is better than the one from which you fled in Iraq several years ago?"

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ISIS's Soldiers Harvest 2 campaign lasted roughly 1yr, during which ISIS scaled up multiple lines of effort it began earlier, including a campaign to erode sources of local resistance within Sunni communities, which Baghdadi justified with an even more extreme fatwa on Takfir
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#ISIS also began reconstituting its capacity to generate waves of VBIED attacks, a signature method. The scale of ISIS's VBIED attacks started to grow in roughly July 2018 during its Soldiers Harvest 2 campaign. The rate is accelerating (including motorcycle versions)

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Perhaps the most worrisome sign of ISIS's success is its re-imposition of taxes on local populations in at least five areas of northern #Iraq. Some reports indicate similar ISIS efforts in rural Deir ez Zour, #Syria ISW warned about this in 2012 stating (citation in report)

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#ISIS declared a new campaign titled the "Battle of Attrition" on May 31, 2019, which will likely last 1yr. ISIS may focus waves of VBIEDs (6+) on cities it intends to seize temporarily. A wave of 6 IEDs in one day in #Kirkuk City in early June is a potential warning sign

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ISIS is most likely to seize terrain in areas where U.S. partners do not operate including central and western #Syria or in the disputed internal boundaries in #Iraq, where security gaps are persistent

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ISIS benefits from a widespread retribution against alleged #ISIS families that has occurred in #Iraq since the recapture of #Mosul. This quote is chilling, and this retribution has continued since 2017 (citation in report)

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Our report assesses #ISIS's key objectives and lines of effort in #Iraq and #Syria during multiple phases of its operations.

We included the @CJTFOIR lines of effort in our timeline graphic for context, as well as pro-#Assad operations against #ISIS

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