Political scientist with a passion for EU affairs, Geek with a passion for technology. Head of Europe Division at SWP (@SWP_Europe). @NvOndarza@eupolicy.social
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Mar 25 • 11 tweets • 2 min read
What does Europe think about a potential return of Trump to the White House?
To get a better understanding, @ClaudMajor, Laura von Daniels and I asked colleagues from 20 European countries both in and outside the EU/NATO.
Here are the results:
swp-berlin.org/publications/p…2/ On first sight, a very similar perspective emerged from most countries, with a triangle of concerns:
Democracy, Defence and trade.
Mar 1 • 10 tweets • 3 min read
As far-right parties are gaining ground across Europe ahead of the #EP2024 elections, @Beckehrung and I have analysed the geostrategic positioning of different far-right parties across five key dimensions.
The results are quite telling:
swp-berlin.org/publikation/ge…
For the analysis, we looked at voting in the EP in regards to EU relations with Russia, China, the US/NATO as well as EU foreign and security policy and enlargement.
We analysed 74 votes during the current legislature, and included all parties to the right of the EPP.
Sep 19, 2023 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
Our report today on reforming the EU in light of enlargement is being grossly misrepresented in UK media.
1) It is an independent report, mandated by the two Europe ministers, not the official position by the French or German government or the EU.
thetimes.co.uk/article/french…2) The focus of the report is to get the EU fit for enlargement and strengthen democracy/rule of law.
The UK is mentioned in a half sentence, for an outer tier of Associate Membership with single market integration, if it wants to. Which neither the UK gov nor Labour wants.
Jan 19, 2023 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
As someone who argued for more European sovereignty - in a Euro-atlantic framework - I am truly baffled the German government communication and decision-making on Leopard 2. The damage it is doing to German credibility and European sovereignty is hard to overstate. /1
First, The German government is arguing it does not want to act alone ('No Alleingänge'). But so many of its European allies - from the Central/Eastern Europe (Poland, Baltics), North (Finland), South (Spain), Northwest (UK) now want to act and are calling for Berlin to do so. /2
Sep 27, 2022 • 6 tweets • 3 min read
Very important thread by @JeremyCliffe on the normalisation of far-right parties in Europe and its cooperation with the centre-right.
@JeremyCliffe First, it's not just centre-right parties moving further to the right (like the US republicans), but also far-right parties becoming more moderate, especially on EU policy. See Meloni, Salvini, Le Pen et al all moving away from calling for their version of either Euro or EU-exit.
Sep 23, 2022 • 10 tweets • 3 min read
Today's massive tax cuts in the new UK budget also mark a turning point in the economics of #Brexit which will decide how the success or failure of Brexit will be judged in the future.
First, at the heart of Brexit was always an economic inconsistency. Some Leavers supported it to protect the UK from globalisation, attacking the EU for being a vehicle of liberal policies.
Sep 9, 2021 • 4 tweets • 3 min read
The almost complete absence of any EU discussion in the German #btw2021 election campaign is bordering on the absurd.
This will be a key election for the EU, but also for determining German policies. But you really need a magnifying glass to find any discussion on EU policies.
The 'Wahl-O-Mat', a vote adviser tool, has only a single question on the EU - "Should Germany leave the EU". This is absolutely irrelevant for German policy and resembles on one extreme party. No question on fiscal policy etc. that could provide nuance betw the major parties.
Mar 5, 2021 • 9 tweets • 2 min read
Pre-Weekend thought on #Brexit, Northern Ireland Protocol and what it means for the EU-UK relations.
To me, part of why the UK is escalating again is due to very different lessons learned from the Internal Market Bill and its effect on the trade negotiations last year.
From a Brexiteer perspective, the Internal Market Bill is often regarded as a successful negotiation ploy. It seemingly showed the EU what a risk no deal would also be to the EU, and how serious the UK was about no deal. It thus helped getting more concessions out of the EU. /2
Feb 26, 2021 • 7 tweets • 3 min read
High time to think about how a possible 'reset' of EU-UK relations can be politically achieved. The EU should be open for this, but I fear the political commitment to make post-#Brexit relations work needs to come from both sides, including the UK government.
5 factors were crucial, incl the dynamic nature of the TCA, still close economic links and the co-responsibility for NI.
Feb 3, 2021 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
UK public discourse seems to be even growing in furore over the Art. 16 debacle. But even if you acknowledge the EU Commission made a mistake, it is time for much needed perspective:
The EU Commission got under quick pressure from Ireland and corrected the mistake within a few hours. Further internal pressure will now lead to safeguards around the NI protocol.
Dec 3, 2020 • 8 tweets • 3 min read
Rumours are flying wild on how close we are to a #Brexit deal. My sense is that a deal is still possible, but the necessary compromises have yet to be made and time is running out soon.
To me it is therefore high time to think also about the political ramifications of no deal.
In this analysis, I look at three political scenarios: 1. Friendly no deal - in which EU and UK seemlessly continue negotiations and try to limit no deal fallout via unilateral actions and mini deals. Ruled out by the EU, though the temptation will be there in some member states.
Oct 1, 2020 • 4 tweets • 4 min read
Always interesting for EU nerds to look at the bilaterals around an #EUCO and what they say about the power dynamics and conflicts between member states.
Out of curiosity, I put together who @eucopresident met around the #EUCO on the MFF/Recovery Fund negotiations in July /1
@eucopresident A few interesting findings:
- Most meetings were with Macron, Merkel and @vonderleyen
- Michel met Merkel and Macron always together, highlighting the Franco-German push on the MFF
- More active EU policy of Sanchez and Conte got them into the inner circle
/2
Sep 24, 2020 • 8 tweets • 4 min read
Today will be the 70th #Königswinter Conference, the annual British-German exchange that brings together great people from the respective governments, parliaments, industries and academia.
It is also a good time to reflect on British-German relations four years into #Brexit.
The good: Foreign and Security Policy has been mostly shielded from Brexit, even during the most difficult negotiations.
The E3 cooperation is going strong, and Germany and the UK continue to cooperate closely in other international fora such as the G7 or the UN.
Sep 16, 2020 • 7 tweets • 4 min read
This morning @vonderleyen will give her first "State of the Union" speech to the European Parliament.
Admittedly, even as an EU nerd I have yet to get attached to the tradition. I would struggle to name a single #SOTEU speech that made a lasting impact.
Could this year be different? Expect a positive outlook after a difficult year, with a focus on Green Deal, digitalisation, the EU coming together over the recovery fund, migration and a touch on European strategic autonomy.
Sep 14, 2020 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
It is almost as if the UK government wants to recreate the atmosphere from the 2019 'Brexit Wars' within the UK parliament.
It is important to stress, however, how vastly different the current #Brexit negotiations are to 2019:
1. The debate about the #InternalMarketBill is about the UK adhering to what it has already agreed, not about what it should agree with the EU.
This why even some ardent Brexiteers oppose it, as it is a question on how the UK stands to the international rule of law.
Sep 10, 2020 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
On #Brexit, today I am again reminded of Nietzsche's tale about the footbridge:
"There was a time in our lives when we were so close that nothing seemed to obstruct our friendship and brotherhood, and only a small footbridge separated us...
Just as you were about to step on it, I asked you: “Do you want to cross the footbridge to me?” —Immediately, you did not want to any more; and when I asked you again, you remained silent...
Sep 8, 2020 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
You know the UK gov is taking an extreme #Brexit position when Dominic Raab - once considered to be the most hardline Brexiteer in the 2019 Tory leadership contest - rejects it as too compromising as a stance.
Thinking through events of the day, it seems to me that the UK gov is finally approaching the point where it can no longer defer to make the trade offs that come with Brexit.
Aug 25, 2020 • 6 tweets • 5 min read
The growing controversy over @PhilHoganEU is a fascinating test case to me of how accountability should or should not work on the EU level.
@PhilHoganEU First, it is a noteworthy example of a national scandal being uploaded to the EU level
Lockdown rules are quite different across the EU, what Hogan did would have been ok in some MS, outra-geous in others. Through Irish media & politics, the case was brought to the EU level /2
Mar 19, 2020 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
So, a co-worker of my wife has tested positive for the #Coronavirus.
On the plus side, I no longer have to look out for 2 kids during home office alone, as her workplace is closed for a week. On the less plus side, it now feels even more likely that we are next.
Some thoughts:
I'm aggrivated over public health authorities. He was tested on Sunday, the result only came today (Thursday), four days later.
Four days during which everyone he had contact with had no idea. It also raises serious question on how many cases run around undetected.
Mar 10, 2020 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
Another great thread by @pmdfoster on the difficulties ahead if the UK completely disassociates from the EU Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).
Also a good time to dust of my paper from April 2018 on 'Brexit and EU Agencies'. /1
@pmdfoster For now, the UK gov is pursuing a policy of maximum distance with the EU, careful not to give the EU any leverage.
From a negotiation stand point, this makes - short sighted - sense, as the EU can no longer impose conditionality on a UK that wants to pick no cherries. /2
Feb 10, 2020 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
There is a growing sense in German commentary that AKK's successor will have to push for the chancellory and/or early elections before 2021.
Would this be a problem for the German EU Presidency? Not on the technical level, as precedents show. /1
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