For those confused about the #ECOWAS Standby Force, a few basic points:
1) It’s the ECOWAS part of the larger African Standby Force (ASF) structure, which comprises 5 regional forces (North, Eastern, Western/ECOWAS, Central, and Southern). 2) It can comprise of military, police and civilian personnel. It can be mandated to perform one of the 6 standard ASF scenarios (below), or anything else ECOWAS authorizes it to do.

During May 2019-April 2020, @UNMAS data shows that #Somalia🇸🇴 was, by far, #Africa's most deadly theater for IED warfare. Main targets were #AMISOM & #SNA moving to/from their FOBs. unmas.org/en/unmas-somal… From 2015-20, the #Somali🇸🇴 National Army #SNA suffered 1,234 injured and 725 fatalities from IEDs (according to UNMAS🇺🇳 data). 2020 was a particularly bad year. unmas.org/en/unmas-somal…

1/ Next week, #SouthKorea🇰🇷 will (now virtually) host the 2021 @UNPeacekeeping🇺🇳 Ministerial meeting. The aims are to discuss key issues in #PeaceOperations + generate concrete pledges of assets & capabilities from 🇺🇳 Member States.
peacekeeping.un.org/en/2021-seoul-… 2/ The pledging summits began in 2014 and have significantly increased the capabilities registered in the UN's🇺🇳 strategic force generation system: the #Peacekeeping Capabilities Readiness System pcrs.un.org/SitePages/Home…

The latest round of serious fighting in #Somalia🇸🇴, finally sees the FGS going after its no.1 enemy: #AlShabaab.*
*Of course not, the FGS is fighting ASWJ, a longstanding religious-inspired militia that has resisted #AlShabaab pretty effectively since at least 2008. 😒 Meanwhile, the UN🇺🇳 Panel of Experts on #Somalia🇸🇴 recorded 1,047 #AlShabaab attacks on #SNA🇸🇴 & international targets over 9 months: 16/12/20-6/9/21. They were mainly hit & run attacks with few designed to hold or capture towns or overrun military bases. reliefweb.int/report/somalia…

1/ The UN🇺🇳 & @_AfricanUnion🟩 have now both conducted "independent" assessments of how best to provide international support to #Somalia🇸🇴 after 2021. The 🇺🇳 team recommended continuing with a reconfigured @amisomsomalia, the AU🟩 team a hybrid AU-UN multidimensional mission. 2/ The AU🟩 team's envisaged AU-led-UN-hybrid mission (AU-UNMIS) would be 50% police (IPOs + FPUs), 35% military, 15% civilian personnel with expanded political powers for the head (Joint🇺🇳🟩 Special Representative). Overall personnel numbers r unspecified.

1/ What military options are available if you’ve got a nasty insurgency attacking parts of your country & citizens? If you're, say, #Mozambique🇲🇿, it turns out the menu of potential options is quite large. Of course, they might not work but here’s the menu as I see it... 2/ In no particular order. Option 1: #Mozambique🇲🇿 could handle its insurgency alone with its own national security forces.

1/ It's fair to say @UNPeacekeeping🇺🇳 is currently in a financial crisis caused largely but not solely by the 🇺🇸 Trump administration. Here's a thread explaining the state of play undocs.org/a/73/809 2/ First a caveat: the numbers fluctuate regularly so what follows are just snapshots. @UNPeacekeeping & its troop- & police-contributing countries (T/PCCs) are reimbursed after the fact. Here's an explainer of how it works via @ipinstGO theglobalobservatory.org/2018/10/in-us-…

1/ It’s 13hrs since #AMISOM posted a Tweet about the mortar attack on the MIA compound in #Somalia🇸🇴. Here it is:

https://twitter.com/amisomsomalia/status/1080122489827672064?s=21

2/ One hour later @UNSomalia issued a press release that directly contradicted what #AMISOM Tweeted about the attack. Here’s that Tweet:

https://twitter.com/unsomalia/status/1080132940506587137?s=21