Former UA officer
Founder of the Frontelligence Insight: https://t.co/dl7rxu5P0O
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2/ After successes in the Ocheretyne area, Russian forces now have slightly more than 10 kilometers of ground between them and the T0504 highway, which connects Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk. However, another potential threat is emerging from the northward-leading road. 
2/ According to on-the-ground reports, occasional Russian groups have temporarily crossed the canal at Chasiv Yar but didn't establish a bridgehead. A geolocated video by @giK1893 shows that Russians tried to set a position in the south of Chasiv Yar at the landbridge crossing 
2/ Ukrainian forces retreated from Ocheretyne and Solovyove. While the 115th brigade was blamed, the core issue is that many brigades are not in a condition to hold the enemy with disproportional advantage in personnel, artillery, vehicles, and air support along the frontline 
2/ Russian companies aiding military production may not be easily discernible. Consider RusAgro, which presents itself solely as a major agricultural player, owned by sanctioned oligarch Vadim Moshkovich. Another key figure is Maxim Basov - its CEO. Keep these names in mind
2/ Chasiv Yar's geography makes it a good defensive position, particularly compared to Bakhmut, blocking Russian progression toward key cities in the Donbas. This is evident on the elevation map, with warmer colors marking higher altitudes and colder colors indicating lower ones 
2/ While it's true that Russia is constantly rebuilding its forces and trying to replace losses, including recruiting new personnel and creating new units and military districts, the reality differs significantly from what appears on paper.
2/ Firstly, on March 7th, the US Embassy in Russia issued a public warning regarding extremist plans to target large gatherings in Moscow, including concerts. Subsequently, after the attacks, the US confirmed sharing this info with RU security forces. US officials suspect ISIS-K 
2/ A comparative analysis shows scorch marks on the roof of a building identified by our team as a Final Assembly Facility, where it was suspected Russians were conducting A-50 repairs. The day before the attack: 
2/ While some argue that the withdrawal was timely, our assessment suggests that an earlier retreat could have reduced losses. Some interviewed participants reported not receiving official orders and chose to retreat at their discretion due to the deteriorating tactical situation
2/ Frontelligence Insight concluded that the Russian company "Special Technology Center," which produces drones for the Russian military, indirectly buys equipment from Keysight Technologies, an American corporation, and MPI Corporation, a Taiwanese company. This is how we know:
2/ A previously abandoned farm in Ol'khovatka, Voronezh Oblast, near the Ukraine border, started to show some signs of activity in late July 2023. By the summer's end, it was fully occupied, with ammo crates filling the dugouts. In November imagery, the facility is still used 
2/ The Belarusian Forces have not significantly changed since the invasion. Modernization is slow, with no notable increase in personnel. Minsk's aggressive rhetoric contrasts with its defensive posture. However, there have been some important changes.
2/ Currently, Russian forces maintain a significant numerical advantage in both personnel and vehicles. Despite initial errors, high losses, and unrealistic expectations, they continuously replenish their troops with fresh recruits and preserve pressure
2/ In January, our team recorded 14 concentrations of artillery and enemy forces, echoing Spring 2023 observations. In this example, vehicle revetments were stocked with supplies and vehicles. We have monitored this specific operational site persisting for multiple weeks 
2/ Frontelligence Insight has estimated the number of ammunition deliveries between September and December to be approximately 1.57 million artillery shells, combining 152mm and 122mm ammo. 
2/ While the northern part of Avdiivka is shielded by the AKHZ (industrial buildings), the southern area is comprised of one to two-story houses susceptible to artillery fire. If unable to capture the area, russians erase it with artillery, deploy infantry, and seize the rubble.
2/Burne - Malovodne branch
2/ Burne - Malovodne branch
2/ We expect Russian forces to continue assaults in areas like Kupyansk-Lyman, Bohdanivka-Kostyantynivka, Novobakhmutivka-Novomykhailivka, and potential counter-attacks in the southern regions, particularly the Robotyne area and Krynky.
2/ Our initial report included over 109 vehicles between October 10th and October 20th, excluding the area west of Vodyane. This time, we expanded our coverage to include the entire area until November 28th, 2023, bringing the total number to 211. 
2/ In November, as Ukrainian forces advanced towards Kherson, the Russian military opted to move their helicopters from the Chaplynka Airdrome to more secure inland locations, including a fenced beach resort in Arabat Split near Crimea. 